Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Питер Дейл Скотт

156. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 243.

157. Bangkok embassy intelligence officer Allan Parks, to Jonathan Kwitny, in Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 59. Kwitny, inquiring about Houghton, was put in touch with Parks by Alexander Butterfield, the revealer in the Watergate Hearings of Nixon’s taping system, who earlier had also been an intelligence officer in Asia. Cf. Russ Baker, Family of Secrets: The Bush Dynasty, the Powerful Forces That Put It in the White House, and What Their Influence Means for America (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 234–35.

158. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 334–35.

159. Trento, Prelude to Terror, 313–14.

160. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 207, 208.

161. James A. Nathan, “Dateline Australia: America’s Foreign Watergate?” Foreign Policy, Winter 1982–1983, 183, quoted in Marshall et al., The Iran-Contra Connection, 38.

162. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 126–27.

163. Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 272–75. Richard Secord was allegedly attempting also to sell Israeli arms with the assistance of Israeli agent David Kimche, another associate of Oliver North. The mujahideen were recruited in Afghanistan by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leading recipient of CIA assistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s and most recently a leader of the al-Qaeda–Taliban resistance to the United States and its client there, Hamid Karzai. See Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7, 8, 20.

164. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 90–97: “[IMU leader] Namangiani’s networks in Tajikistan and in Central Asia were used to smuggle opium from Afghanistan. It was partly thanks to Namangiani’s contacts in Chechnya that heroin reached Europe” (91). . . . “It was thanks to the mediation of Chechen criminal groups that the KLA and the Albanian mafia managed to gain control of the transit of heroin in the Balkans” (96). Napoleoni does not mention Azerbaijan, which, however, lies between Uzbekistan and Chechnya.

165. “KLA Funding Tied to Heroin Profits,” Washington Times, May 3, 1999.

166. Daniel Ellsberg with Kris Welch, KPFA, August 26, 2006, http://wotisitgood4

.blogspot.com/2006/10/ellsberg-hastert-got-suitcases-of-al.html.

167. Sibel Edmonds and Philip Giraldi, “Found in Translation: FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds Spills Her Secrets,” American Conservative, November 2009, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/nov/01/00006.

168. Vanity Fair, September 2005. According to the American-Turkish Council’s website, “As one of the leading business associations in the United States, the American-Turkish Council (ATC) is dedicated to effectively strengthening U.S.-Turkish relations through the promotion of commercial, defense, technology, and cultural relations. Its diverse membership includes Fortune 500, U.S. and Turkish companies, multinationals, nonprofit organizations, and individuals with an interest in U.S.-Turkish relations.” It is thus comparable to the American Security Council, the activities of which in 1963 are discussed in Scott, Deep Politics, e.g., 292.

Edmonds has been partially corroborated by Huseyin Baybasin, another Turkish heroin kingpin now in jail in Holland, in his book Trial by Fire: “I handled the drugs which came through the channel of the Turkish Consulate in England.” But, as he adds, “I was with the Mafia but I was carrying this out with the same Mafia group in which the rulers of Turkey were part.” Baybasin claimed he was assisted by Turkish officers working for NATO in Belgium (Adrian Gatton, “The Susurluk Legacy,” Druglink Magazine, November/December 2006, http://adriangatton.com/archive/1990_01_01_archive.html).

169. The major exception would appear to be the Gulf War of 1990–1991. But even here some argue that the United States shares some responsibility for inducing that war. See, e.g., Edward Mortimer: “It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law” (New York Review of Books, November 22, 1990). It can also be argued that the Korean War itself deserves mention in both lists: see Peter Dale Scott, “Korea (1950), the Tonkin Gulf Incident, and 9/11: Deep Events in Recent American History,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, June 22, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-Peter_Dale_Scott/2784.

170. Marshall, Drug Wars, 55, citing Tad Szulc, “The Money Changer,” New Republic, April 10, 1976, 10–11.

171. See Scott, The War Conspiracy.

172. Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” 239–64.

173. AMPO (Japan), January 1974, 44 (Indonesia); David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 90 (Deak); Marshall, Drug Wars, 54–55 (Katayama, Kodama). Both Kodama and Sasakawa were arrested by the United States for war crimes but not prosecuted. In 1941, Kodama had plotted the assassination of Japan’s Prime Minister Konoye by dynamite to block his attempted peace negotiations with the United States. Kodama then made a fortune in Shanghai during World War II, allegedly in part through his control of the drug traffic in conjunction with the kempeitai. Both Kodama and Sasakawa became staunch supporters of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, which, as we have seen, has had persistent connections to the postwar Asian drug traffic.

174. Beaty and Gwynn, The Outlaw Bank, 48; cf. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 160. As mentioned earlier, Haq’s son has persuaded me that there is no evidence to suggest that his father, the former military governor of the Northwest Frontier province, profited personally from the flow of drugs that Hekmatyar and others were moving through his province.

175. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House (New York: Summit, 1983), 279, 290.

176. Dinges, The Condor Years, 190–98.

177. Robert Parry, Secrecy and Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from